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STUDY PROJECT

FACULTY IDENTIFICATION, RECRUITMENT, SELECTION, ASSIGNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

BY

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
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A wide range of civilian and military theorists indicate that the faculty of an educational institution is the crucial element in the educational process. Recent assessments of military educational institutions indicate that a quality faculty is critical for the success of the institution. This project is focused on the Marine Corps University faculty and examines the system and policies affecting the identification, recruitment, selection, assignment, preparation and development of military faculty. The project also examines factors affecting faculty effectiveness and makes recommendations to improve the current system of faculty management to better meet the challenges and uncertainties of the future.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

FACULTY IDENTIFICATION, RECRUITMENT, SELECTION,
ASSIGNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE
MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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A wide range of civilian and military theorists indicate that the faculty of an educational institution is the crucial element in the educational process. Recent assessments of military educational institutions indicate that a quality faculty is critical for the success of the institution. This project is focused on the Marine Corps University faculty and examines the system and policies affecting the identification, recruitment, selection, assignment, preparation and development of military faculty. The project also examines factors affecting faculty effectiveness and makes recommendations to improve the current system of faculty management to better meet the challenges and uncertainties of the future.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Spenser Wilkinson near the end of his book, <u>The Brain of An Army</u>, in which he describes the German General Staff and military educational process states "It is not contended that the system here described is perfect. Every system has its failures, and there is no possibility of entirely excluding the influences of favour or prejudice."[1]

Similarly, neither is the current military educational system perfect nor free from failures. Although the recent House Panel on Military Education concluded that military education was sound, "This judgement, however, in no way diminishes the conviction of the panel that significant improvements can and should be made."[2]

Military educational institutions are complex and dynamic organizations firmly grounded in tradition. They continue today as an expression of the military's attempts to meet the ever increasing demands of modern warfare and the uncertainty of the future. Therefore, there are numerous methods which can be used to evaluate them.

Martin van Creveld, the military historian, in his book, <u>The Training of Officers</u>, used an historical approach. His prescriptions were thus derived from historical analysis. For example, he traces the ever increasing complexity of warfare and the burgeoning full time officer corps in the eighteenth century and concludes that the establishment and growth of advanced military schools was due to a combination of two factors. First, the growing amount of military theory which required mastery for success in campaigning. Second, the increasing number of

professional full time military officers who had little constructive to do in peacetime. A futurist like Alvin Toffler, author of Learning for Tomorrow, The Role of the Future in Education, would contend that in order to evaluate military educational institutions, it would be prudent to discern the future for which they are to be prepared. Some educators would argue that it is the curriculum which provides the structure for an educational institution and therefore it is the logical beginning for educational institutional analysis.[3] If you approached military educational institutions from a systems approach, however, then the students as the input and output would provide the focus for analysis.[4]

Notwithstanding the validity or relevance of the aforementioned methods, this paper will focus on military faculty and critically examine the system and policies affecting the identification, recruitment, selection, assignment, preparation, and development of military faculty. A wide range of studies indicate that the faculty of an educational institution is the crucial element or factor in the educational process and that a superior curriculum or outstanding student body cannot overcome a mediocre faculty.[5] This paper concentrates on the U.S. Marine Corps' Marine Corps University (MCU) at Quantico, Virginia which forms the centerpiece of Marine Corps education for officers.

By way of methodology, the paper will first describe the Marine Corps University and its composition. Second, it will review the current process for identifying, recruiting, selecting,

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preparing and developing faculty members. Assessments, observations, analysis and conclusions will be offered o each component of the process as they are discussed. Finally, the paper will recommend changes to the process that the Marine Corps University might realistically expect to implement.

THE MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

The Marine Corps University is a direct institutional descendant of the Marine Corps Schools organized at Quantico during the 1920s. The major features of the Marine Corps' present military education system were set in place in the 1920s and 1930s and have evolved in mission and scope to the present. Therefore, many of the problems described in this paper are the result of decisions made decades ago. The University, as a concept, was an idea of General A. M. Gray, the 29th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. The University was established in 1989 as part of an overall restructuring of the Marine Corps educational system.

The Marine Corps University contains organizations that differ widely in focus, scope and purpose. It utilizes a tiered approach to education and each school builds on the foundation of the school lower in the tier. It is not a university in the academic sense as there is no student exchange among the schools as they are not focused at the same educational level. It is more analogous to a state educational system utilizing junior colleges to source the university and the university to source the state's professional and graduate schools.

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The Marine Corps University is headed by a brigadier general who serves as President of the University. It consists of the Staff Non-Commissioned Officers Academy, The Basic School, Amphibious Warfare School, Communications Officer School, Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting and the Marine Corps War College. See Figure 1. The Staff Non-Commissioned Officers Academy will not be examined in this paper as it uses only enlisted faculty members. All of the other schools use commissioned or warrant officers as faculty members. In addition, the schools are also staffed with civilian faculty; however, this paper will focus on military faculty and staff members only. Each school is headed by a full colonel who serves as director or commanding officer.

The Basic School (TBS) is the primary school for all lieutenants. Its purpose is:

> To provide newly commissioned officers a basic professional education and to instill in them the esprit and leadership traditional to the Marine Corps in order to prepared them to assume the duties and responsibilities of company-grade officers in the field and in garrison. Additionally, the Infantry Officer Basic Course provides a basic understanding of infantry skills so that the graduate can properly support ground combat operations and can also perform infantry duties.[6]

Marine Corps captains attend either the Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) or the Communications Officer School (COS). Marine Corps majors attend the Command and Staff College (C&S). A select few majors stay at Command and Staff College an additional year and attend The School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW). Lieutenant colonels and colonels attend the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR).

FIGURE 1. MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY CIRCA 1993

A review of the purpose and mission of each individual school is not necessary, however, they are progressive in nature. The matrix below illustrates:

School	Level	Warfighting Focus	Organizational Focus
TBS/IOC	Lt	Tactical	Platoon and company
AWS	Capt	Tactical	Regiment, Group and below
COS	Capt	Command, Control Communication, Computers, & Intell	Regiment, Group and above
C&S	Maj	Operational	Division, Wing and above
SAW	Maj	Operational Art	Echelons above division and Wing
MCWAR	LtCol/Col	Strategy	Echelons above division and Wing, interagency, coalitions and national policy

FACULTY

The faculty, for purposes of this paper, are the officers assigned to each school regardless of billet or occupational specialty whose primary duty is student instruction or curriculum design. The faculty teach, coach, mentor, instruct, supervise and yes--learn. The faculty is the spark that ignites the learning process and their importance cannot be understated.

Emphasis on military faculty and its critical importance is not new. A cursory review of military history reveals that during the early nineteenth century, Scharnhorst reformed the noted Prussian War Academy and expanded the quantity and quality of the faculty.[7]

Scharnhorst felt that it "was the professor who utilized the force of his will and the power of his personality to arouse his pupils to think and work with a receptive mind that most effectively accomplished his mission."[8] The very reputation of the institution, Scharnhorst felt, relied on the attributes of the faculty.[9]

T. N. Dupuy's book, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, highlights the importance of education to a military institution as evidenced by the professionalism of the German general staff. Scharnhorst's academy and the later Kriegsakademie were an integral part of the professionalism of the General Staff. Faculty duty at the Kriegsakademie was a "coveted assignment and an honor."[10] During the interwar years faculty members were handpicked by the Chief of Training of the General Staff who during his annual tour of units interviewed and screened prospective faculty members.[11] The German Army was directed to provide its best officers for instructor duty and to free these instructors of all duties during the summer so they could prepare for the upcoming school year.[12] Former faculty members read like a "who's who" of modern German military history to include von Kluge, List, Model, von Paulus, Guderian and Halder.[13]

The interwar years in the United States saw the establishment of comprehensive officer educational programs within the separate services. The services worked on incorporating the lessons learned from World War I into the schools and preparing for the next war.

Dr. Robert Berlin, Professor of Military Art and Science at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, in his study of U.S. Army World War II Corps commanders observed that one reason for the success and vitality of interwar officer education was due to the quality of instructors.[14] He found that "every one of the Regular Army Officers in this study served as an instructor somewhere in the Army educational system."[15] Another study of U.S. Army World War II division commanders found that the most frequent assignment during the interwar years "was that of instructor."[16]

While it is difficult to proclaim a theory that instructors or military faculty members make good commanders, there does seem to be some connection between teaching, professional development and command.[17] Both the German pre World War II experience and our own interwar educational experience build a case for professional education, either as a student or instructor, as a key element in professional development.

The House Panel on Military Education stated that "The importance of a competent, credible, and dedicated faculty to both the fabric and reputations of our PME institutions cannot be overstated."[18] Martin Van Creveld similarly states that "no school can be better than its faculty, no other factor is so vital to reform as a drastic upgrading of the staff."[19] Civilian educators also agree that the quality of a school is directly related to faculty quality.[20]

Given the relationship between faculty duty and professional development it is important to remember that each year the Marine

Corps University not only sends hundreds of graduates to assignments throughout the Corps, but it also transfers a lesser number of faculty members. The old quip, "if you really want to know a subject, then try to teach it," comes to mind. Former faculty members represent a vast reservoir of knowledge applicable to key assignments throughout the Marine Corps.

FACULTY IDENTIFICATION, SELECTION RECRUITMENT AND PREPARATION

The identification, selection and subsequent recruitment of faculty is the life's blood of an educational institution. It is especially important for a military educational institution, however, as a significant number of faculty members complete their assigned tours each year as per the military assignment process and must be replaced. The process of faculty recruitment for a military educational institution is thus continuous.

The separate schools of the MCU identify prospective faculty members to replace anticipated losses. The process is characterized by input from all current serving faculty members on likely candidates who they know may want to come to Quantico to teach and who are available for permanent change of station orders. Implicit is the notion that the serving faculty member feels the prospective candidate is operationally competent. Each school forwards a consolidated "wish list" to the Marine Corps University for review and further consolidation before forwarding to the officer assignment branch of the Personnel Management Division of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Duplications; i.e., officers

desired by more than one school are adjudicated by the Marine Corps University.

The officer assignment branch reviews the list and deletes officers already designated for other assignments or officers anticipated for selection for other assignments. Remaining officers are slated for assignment to the Marine Corps University and other officers are added to subsequent lists as replacements for those assigned elsewhere.

There is merit to this decentralized process. It works moderately well, most of the time, because the organization is small and the professional reputations of most officers are known. There are problems, however, as with any system. But, the problems stem more from the parameters governing the process than the process itself.

Command and Staff College has imposed strict guidelines on the educational requirements for its faculty and has created a process to grow "its own" faculty with the institution of the Marine Corps War College.[21] The process and educational requirements at the other schools are ad hoc and driven more by officer availability than recognized competence or educational requirements. For example, during the period 1989-1992, Amphibious Warfare School recruited faculty members who were resident graduates of Command & Staff College, others who had not completed any resident education since entering the Marine Corps and several officers who had completed the resident Amphibious Warfare Course. The mix at The Basic School was similar. Notwithstanding the individual success

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or failure of these groups of officers, what are the effects on the institution?

When you consider that the schools consider their faculty members as role models and mentors for the students in addition to being operationally experienced, what message do we send to the students by assigning captains to The Basic School and majors to Amphibious Warfare School who fail selection for promotion? Unfortunately, this phenomenon exists within the Marine Corps University and The Basic School in particular has experienced selection rates lower than the general officer population average. The results are lowered faculty morale, less credibility and decreased respect for the faculty from the student body.

Ideally, the faculty should possess technical knowledge, higher level teaching skills and be well founded in the theory of war.[22] Therefore, the prospective faculty member's education should be considered as well as his performance and availability. Logically, the faculty member should be educated at a higher level than the student.

For a variety of reasons, current assignment practices do not support this desire. Most company grade officers assigned as faculty members at The Basic School have not attended Amphibious Warfare School. In fact, many of these officers attend Amphibious Warfare School or one of the U.S. Army branch advanced courses upon completion of their instructor assignments. The only thing separating them from the students they teach is operational experience as a platoon commander. Notwithstanding, individual

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efforts at professional self-study, the officers as a group are educationally the equals of the students.

Why not then source a majority of The Basic School faculty and staff from the Amphibious Warfare School or the U.S. Army branch schools? There would be two major benefits. First, the officers by virtue of the benefit of career level school are better educated in every sense of the word and are not only well founded in our current doctrine, but the theory behind it. They would, as a group, be more confident as group leaders in the "active learning" process and require less preparation time. Maneuver warfare philosophy asks the officer to think "two levels up" the chain. Thus, a student lieutenant at The Basic School needs to understand the battalion commander's intent and vision for success. A graduate of Amphibious Warfare School or Communications Officers School is well founded in battalion/task force level operations and can assist in cementing this link for the lieutenant while a non graduate has only his platoon commander experience to rely on. Prospective faculty candidates could be screened and interviewed during the school year and tentative class assignments made, thus allowing a student to bone-up in particular areas. The transition from one academic environment to another would offer not only family stability, but alleviate uncertainties about the next assignment well in advance. Second, in breaking the institutional reliance on availability and "old boy" networking for faculty recruitment the institution gains the benefits derived from the school screening process used to select officers for school. That

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is, the career school selection process adds a quality filter to faculty identification, recruitment, selection, assignment and preparation. This filter or qualitative screening could potentially result in fewer Marine Corps University faculty members failing selection for the next grade.

The concept is in use at Command and Staff College whereby Marine Corps War College graduates provide the source of some of the Command and Staff College faculty. This novel use of assets not only reflects innovation and increases faculty preparation, but also expresses a firm commitment to building a first class faculty.[23] The concept could be expanded and applied throughout the University whereby Command & Staff College graduates would source the client schools; that is, AWS and COS. Graduates of Amphibious Warfare School would therefore source the client school--The Basic School.

Our current personnel management practices will make this concept difficult to implement throughout the university as most COS and AWS graduates return to the Fleet Marine Forces. This practice is driven by our current practice of pulling lieutenants out of their initial tour after three years. More lieutenants need tu be left in the operating forces for 4-5 years. This population of officers would then be ideal candidates to attend school and move on to faculty duty.

FACULTY DEVELOPMENT

Faculty development means different things to different people. Faculty development, for purposes of this paper, is the

"improvement or development of faculty skills in advising and teaching, growth in scholarship and research capacity, and acquisition of new skills or training for redirection."[24] Professional educators don't all agree on faculty development and programs vary from school to school.[25] For example, at Amphibious Warfare School faculty development is a "process comprised of three variables: attitudes, skill/knowledge, and opportunity."[26] Further, the goal of faculty development at Amphibious Warfare School is to increase faculty performance.[27]

Among the schools of the University, faculty development varies in content, scope and priority. All of the MCU schools have published faculty development plans. Faculty development, however, suffers from a lack of priority compared to the curriculum and a lack of qualified educators to implement and maintain the faculty development program. Additionally, it is presented in an unsystematic approach due to availability of instructors and faculty availability.

The average new Marine Corps University faculty member arrives during the summer shortly before the start of the new academic year. Even though The Basic School operates on a 12 month continuous cycle a majority of its faculty also arrive during the period May through August. This is particularly important and key because there is little time to get settled, take leave and get ready for a new assignment as classes start in early August. The new faculty member brings along operational experience appropriate to grade and specialty, but has never taught before in a formal

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educational setting.

In the past, the Marine Corps University has conducted a workshop for all faculty and staff during mid July. The length varied from 2-5 days and covered everything from the Marine Corps University campaign plan to facets of maneuver warfare. Unfortunately, all new faculty members do not attend as some have not yet arrived and there were no make-up sessions.

Following this fast paced, cursory workshop the separate schools generally conduct a faculty workshop averaging 3-4 days in length. Topics covered, include the school directors charge to the new faculty, resident faculty and any outside educators such as the english instructors; an overview of the curriculum; a review of the school's academic performance evaluation system; the role of the faculty member; budget reviews; presentations on learning theory and a review of the standard operating procedures. The focus is thus primarily administrative. The Basic School, which does not operate on an academic year cycle, conducts a more personalized, informal faculty orientation which usually includes the new faculty member "piggybacking" with an experienced instructor through several blocks of instruction for which he will soon be responsible. For the new faculty at other schools, the school workshops are usually followed by extensive reading packets and personalized sessions with experienced instructors. From time to time throughout the year the Marine Corps University and the schools schedule a few faculty development sessions on a variety of topics.

As classes start in early August for most of university schools, the focus shifts to training sessions conducted by individual problem directors covering upcoming instruction. The purpose is specific preparation for a block of instruction to include administration, methodology, goals, techniques and tips on instruction. Although instruction is not completely standardized, these sessions try to ensure the problem director's objectives are met in each small group or lecture. Sessions continue throughout the year prior to blocks of instruction.

Other faculty development is an individual responsibility. The level of subject matter expertise, reading, research and writing are all functions of individual background and inclination.

Some former instructors recalling their first year as a faculty member call this method of faculty development the Darwinan Method, i.e., the survival of the fittest. Obviously, the more experienced and more educated the individual officer is when he arrives, has a great deal to do with his future development and performance. Two weeks or less of fast paced introductory, administrative material, shortly after or in the midst of a permanent change of station move, is not the best environment to foster understanding. Overall, the system relies on the faculty member's own initiative.

Thus, the major thrust of the faculty development program for a first year faculty member is to give him enough knowledge to function effectively. Much of the process is on-the-job training. Unfortunately, in the schools that function on an academic year,

there is precious little time to develop subject matter depth. Therefore, the faculty member who arrives without a firm grasp of the theory of war and its application in Marine Crops doctrine will not find it an easy obstacle to negotiate. The curriculum is a fast moving train and in the end becomes a treadmill.[28] This situation results in the faculty member sticking with what he knows and therefore exhibiting defensive and dogmatic behavior in front of the students.[29] His focus becomes one of mastering the material, not on making the material interesting. Thus, education suffers as the faculty member can't stretch the student and the learning process degenerates to the "simple, the explicit, the measurable, and the 'safe ground' of the instructor's limited expertise."[30] This cycle gives ammunition to civilian military reformers like Bill Lind, a frequent critic of military education, to respond with remarks like the one quoted below, which was arguably more true in 1986 than currently is the case.

> While the faculties at (AWS and C&SC) include some highly competent individuals, the general quality is low, reflecting the low priority the schools have at the personnel office. Faculty preparation is almost nil...[31]

The faculty development system at the University appears to be founded on the belief that past experience and dedication supplemented with on-the-job training and reinforced with a cursory semi-formal faculty development program is satisfactory. Currently, missing is emphasis and a systematic approach.

Arguably, the faculty development program needs to be emphasized. Leadership is the key to a robust faculty development program.[32] If the President of the University supports the program

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and attends along with the school directors, the program will grow, prosper and nurture the faculty as required.

Faculty development needs to be approached in a comprehensive, long term, systematic manner. The topics for faculty development at each school and the university should be developed just as for any other class. The classes should have a purpose and relevance to the tasks at hand. And ultimately there should be some form of linkage both among the classes and to the curriculum. A class one month on learning theory followed by a discussion on the Myers-Briggs test the next month provides, at best, useful information. But, this shotgun approach does not approach the issue in a sequential, progressive manner and may in fact not be delivering insights that the faculty requires.

There is a direct relationship between the organizational behavior of an educational institution and the ability of the faculty to be more effective.[33] The organizational behavior at the Marine Corps University should send a clear signal that faculty development is important by instituting measures to design, implement and resource a robust program.

FACULTY ENVIRONMENT

Personnel turbulence affects all Marine units and institutions. In the Fleet Marine Forces personnel turbulence impacts negatively on unit cohesion and potentially can undermine training and unit readiness. The Marine Corps University also suffers from personnel turbulence with some key second and third order effects.

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A college dean is fond of quoting an anecdote attributed to Charles William Eliot, for decades the president of Harvard, "who was wont to say that students come in and out of a university's doors, that administrators come and go, but that the faculty is forever."[34]

Unlike Harvard, the standard tour within the Marine Crops University for faculty and staff is three years. For the Marine Corps University school directors and commanding officers this equates to a planning factor of a 33 percent turnover of faculty and staff yearly. Unfortunately, however, external factors can combine to push the level of turbulence and turnover among faculty and staff to higher levels. This can have a debilitating effect on faculty and staff continuity, but more importantly it diminishes faculty effectiveness.[35] The effects of turbulence is worse in the smaller schools where the economy of scale can push the level of turbulence closer to 45 percent.

Faculty and staff do not complete a full three year tour for a variety of reasons to include personal problems and the needs of the Marine Corps. Given there will always be unplanned and unexpected factors that affect faculty and staff turnover, the best we can do as an institution is to attempt to minimize the effects of these factors or policies through the application of prudent judgement. Transferring second year instructors to fill joint assignments and regimental S-3 billets isn't prudent however.

Increasing the tour length to four years for some or all

faculty and staff at the Marine Corps University would cut the planned turbulence rate to 25 percent yearly and increase both continuity and effectiveness. Initially, this would deprive some officers of doing all of the things that captains, majors and lieutenant colonels want to do; however, it would be a boon for faculty continuity, increase family stability and decrease permanent change of station move costs. In the macro sense it would be good for the Marine Corps.

The institution of the command screening process and subsequent command selection appears to have the potential to add to the level of turbulence as does the practice of transferring officers selected for school before completing their standard tour. Both highlight the lack of coordination between the Marine Corps University and the assignment and policy makers at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Why self-impose turbulence on good people working in good organizations? Either the officers should be retained on station and school or command deferred or they shouldn't have been assigned in the first place. Basically, a coordinated and consistent policy would assist in minimizing the effects of self-imposed turbulence.

One of the interesting second order effects of faculty turbulence is the impact on the curriculum. Notwithstanding changes in the curriculum due to doctrinal changes, which are few, new faculty members are prone to revise their courses, change lesson plan formats, make new slides, viewgraphs, etc. It is human nature to want to make the lesson yours, but it also leads to

excessive tinkering with the curriculum.[36] Frederick H. Hartman a noted scholar and former Naval War College faculty member and Special Academic Advisor to the President of the Naval War College states in Lawrence J. Korb's The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S. that ". . . enormous quantities of faculty energy are absorbed into course revisions. Since that faculty is not possessed of pronounced educational expertise, that time could be better spent on learning method and curriculum substance."[37] New faculty members make changes in form because they aren't comfortable with the substance of the curriculum. The amount of cosmetic change taking place in a school with a 40 percent turnover in faculty is considerable.

The curriculum is also affected by changes in the leadership of the schools within the Marine Corps University. Currently, the commanding officer or school director billets are designated as command billets for colonels. The normal tour is two years. This poses a problem for the energetic new school director who wants to put his stamp on the institution.[38] Normally, the curriculum is set when the new director arrives and other than changes on the margin, the prudent leader normally watches his predecessor's curriculum execute for six months to a year before instituting major changes. However, sometimes new school directors are compelled to make changes given their perception of what the curriculum should be or are directed to make changes. The result often is too much change and extra work for the faculty and staff. Over a two year tour the curriculum is subjected to a new cycle of

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change before the earlier plan has been fully implemented, completed and/or evaluated for effectiveness. A noted Army historian, describes this ever present institutional phenomenon and its results at Command and General Staff College circa 1975:

> Ironically, the relatively short tours of Commandants, which are intended to keep Leavenworth current with the outside Army, often prevent the continuation and successful fruition of promising, forward-thinking programs. The short tours also often expose the College to too much change. That is, every Commandant is an individual with his own perceptions of the needs of the Leavenworth graduate, and each has acted to ensure that the graduate possesses the qualities and skills the incumbent Commandant considers most important. Differing perceptions of different Commandants, however, can result in the beginning of a new cycle of change before an earlier cycle has been completed.[39]

The Marine Corps has recently recognized the critical importance of the school director and commanding officer billets by including them on the command selection list. The next step is to recognize that these billets are not ordinary billets and that the results or the output of the schools will be affecting the Marine Corps for decades. The House Committee on Armed Services panel on military education observed that short tours of commandants at some of the military colleges ". . . is not in the best interest of the institutions, especially the faculty."[40] The panel noted the complexity of the colleges as institutions and recommended stabilizing the tours of duty at a minimum of three years.[41] The short sightedness of continuing to treat these billets as regular assignments denies the logic of what is at risk by self imposed institutional turbulence and points to the conclusion that real strides in educational growth can only occur over time and under

the direction of our most able colonels.

Look at the benefits derived from General George C. Marshall's five year tour as the Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Under his direction the scope and focus of the curriculum was changed to reflect the fog and uncertainties of war; a book called Infantry in Battle, still used today by both The Basic School and Amphibious Warfare School, was published; and two hundred of either his faculty or students served as general officers in World War II.[42] Therefore, it is essential that we give our leaders the time required to make, supervise and evaluate change.

Another more subtle second order effect of turbulence is increased faculty workload. Faculty and staff in the Marine Corps University work hard. There are many reasons for this, however, faculty and staff turbulence contributes to faculty workload and results in a lack of institutional memory in the military school house. Faculty and staff overcome this lack of institutional memory by maintaining very detailed "turnover" files. The necessity to suboptimize in this manner takes time, time which could obviously be better spent on content. Masland and Radway observed in their seminal benchmark study on military education that:

> One result, for example, is that an inordinate amount of time, at least by the standards of a civilian educational institution, is devoted to administrative details. Because the "institutional memory" is short, elaborate files must be maintained and each unit of instruction, or lectures, and so forth, so officers fresh from other assignments can take over.[43]

Most schools within the Marine Corps University, in fact, require the production and maintenance of turnover files and even designate a format. Although there is some benefit to having the material organized, the rate of turbulence increases the amount of institutional faculty time spent on administrative matters.

Few instructors have the personal courage, self-confidence, academic background and time to disregard the requirement as Boney Fuller, the British military writer, did when assigned to teach tactics at Camberly Staff College. Fuller began by destroying every document in his predecessor's office and starting over.[44] Fortunately, for Camberly and Fuller, he had written most of his lectures before arriving.

Related to the "institutional memory" problem in Marine Corps schools is another manifestation of faculty turbulence that can be described as "continuity." It is hard to quantify, but organizations don't work as effectively with yearly influxes of new people to replace people who have themselves only been there a short time. Again, Masland and Radway describe the phenomenon well:

> We have been told many times that it takes an officer one year to learn the job, and that during his last year he is thinking about his next assignment. If he serves a full three years, this gives him only one year of peak efficiency. The practice of rotation is defended, among other reasons, as a means of infusing "new blood" into the institution. But it does not appear to work out this way. As an officer at one of the colleges remarked, "Lots of wonderful new ideas and suggestions are made every year, we all nod our heads in agreement. But before anybody can do anything about them, we all are gone. Next year, the new fellows just as bright as we are, come up with the same ideas, but the situation is repeated all over again."[45]

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A lack of continuity can also affect an institution's capability to make change. One study states that the "typical officer is seldom in a position long enough to master it, to the degree that he is able and willing to innovate. Insecurity born of unfamiliarity breeds conservationism, risk avoidance, and adherence to the herd."[46]

What is a manageable level of institutional turbulence? The schools are functioning at the current levels. Classes matriculate and graduate and instructors come and go. The question, however, is what is the impact of turbulence on education in the Marine Corps University? Can we do better?

EDUCATIONAL APPROACH

The Marine Corps University schools use a wide variety of educational methodologies to facilitate and evaluate learning. The list includes the activities shown below:

Lecture	Panels
Tactical Exercise	Campaign Analyses
Without Troops	Staff Rides
Field Exercises	Symposia
Case Studies	Sand Tables
Oral Presentations	Wargames and Simulations
Research projects	

The strengths and weaknesses of the individual methods are beyond the scope of this paper; however, there is a great deal of both art and science involved in selecting the best mix of methodologies for a period of instruction.

Generally, the Marine Corps University schools have participated in the trend common to many military schools and institutions in the move from "passive" to "active" learning.[47]

Until recently, the Marine Corps Schools and most other miiltary educational institutions used the standard approach of teaching; that is, how we were taught as children. Over time and due to research and study it became obvious that adults were more than grown up children.[48] That is, adults have accumulated experience, they want to learn and have a perspective on applying what they are learning in the immediate future. This conclusion drove the trend to adult education or active learning.

Basically, passive learning or traditi'·nal, pedagogical learning is characterized by students passively listening to and observing a lecture, demonstration, panel discussion or symposium.[49] Passive learning evaluations are multiple choice, true/false or fill in the blank objective type examinations. Implicit in this approach is the student's dependence on the teacher to provide the information or content, preparation and motivation.[50] The thrust is content oriented with a corresponding right answer or approved school solution. The typical passive learning environment is the lecture hall or room with one instructor and 200 students. Active learning, on the other hand, is characterized by active participation of the student to include written and oral presentations expressing the student's views followed by a defense of these views based on faculty and peer critiques.[51] In active learning the burden is on the student to prepare, analyze and present his/her views. The thrust is on the process of how to think, not what to think. Thus, there may be multiple correct or valid answers and no school solution. Active

learning evaluations are characterized by essay examinations, research projects, and decisionmaking exercises. Further, the most effective active learning environment is the small seminar or conference group where each student has the opportunity to participate.[52]

Educational institutions are rarely 100% active or passive in orientation and instructional methodologies, of course, are not mutually exclusive to either style of learning and thus overlap. However, the key is the overarching educational environment characterized by the role of the student. That is, is the student actively or passively involved in the process?

The results of this trend and ongoing progress to active learning have been positive, but are nonetheless difficult to quantify. Today the MCU schools conduct fewer hours of lecture and more hours of small group discussions and practical exercises. The schools evaluate less with objective type examinations and more frequently with essay subjective examinations. However, there have been several unplanned and unforeseen second order effects as a result of the trend from passive to active learning.

First, the process has added to faculty workload and impacted on faculty morale. The average faculty or staff member is not a professional educator and has not been exposed either in civilian schools or military schools to the active learning model. A study at the Air War College emphasizes that point.

> The transition from emphasis on _learning_ by the
> traditional method of instruction (lectures) to emphasis
> on _learning_ by the modern instructional method (seminars,
> case studies) is time consuming and intellectually very

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painful.[53]

The task described above was not an easy one as it involved reversing attitudes and perceptions of faculty who had been educated using the passive model and had teaching experience using the passive model.[54]

In the transition process faculty members were required to conduct business as usual day-to-day, but for the long term start the shift to active learning. This shift sounds simple, but it was more difficult than presumed especially when faculty members aren't well founded in the philosophy. Generally, most officers have grown up with passive learning and may have never observed, experienced or read about active learning. Instructors involved in this transition at any institution soon realize that it involves not only more work to conduct the shift, but a complete change in the environment. The quote below aptly describes this transition at Fort Leavenworth during the 1970s but it is corrborated by the author's personal experience:

> The transition from a lecture or conference to the work group was not easy. Such a change involved a complete redoing of instructional material, homework reading assignments, viewgraph transparencies, lesson plans and instructor thinking. The entire philosophy and paraphernalia of the classroom had to be changed.[55]

Generally, the shift to active learning is measured by the movement of lecture classes to small groups or seminars. Thus, large portions of the curriculum that had used lecture as a methodology were now taught using discussion or practical exercises in a small group. As progress was made on the shift away from lecture and to small groups another more subtle impact on faculty

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workload became apparent. Although the single primary instructor no longer carried the burden of lesson plan preparation and hours of rehearsal for lecture, the collective effort to execute the class was now multiplied by the number of small group instructors. Heretofore individual instructors might observe the primary instructor's lecture, or read his lesson plan or conduct other work of their own. Although the designated small group instructors did not need to be subject matter experts like the passive environment primary instructor, they did have to master the material and participate in the small group discussion or practical exercise. Thus, more collective faculty time was required for an individual block of instruction. Further, as noted at Fort Leavenworth in the 1970s and at Quantico today the shift also resulted in more classroom time for each instructor.[56] The result being that each faculty member was spending more time preparing for each individual class and more time in the classroom. The level of preparation required to function in the small group varied with the subject, however, it soon became obvious that some faculty members did not have the background to stretch and take on more of the core curriculum in the small groups. The result was an increase in formal faculty training and a level of preparation in some faculty that was less than desired.

This relationship between the shift of heretofore core curriculum lecture classes to small groups taught by an interdisciplinary faculty, like the MCU's is well documented in Robert J. Seniker's case study on the effects of this type of

change on the Columbia University Business School. His conclusion was that it could only be solved with a robust in-service faculty training program.[57]

The above comments directly relate to the short term effects of the shift from passive to active learning. But, as none of the schools have evolved to a total active learning environment and have changed methodologies incrementally, the process or transition is ongoing as are the effects. Thus, faculty workload and classroom contact hours will continue to increase.

The impact of the change to active learning type evaluations also has had and continues to have an impact on faculty workload. Multiple-choice, matching, true/false and completion objective examinations are normally associated with passive learning. They are easy to grade by manual grading guides or even by machine. There is one correct answer and the student receives timely, feedback from the evaluation. Also, objective examinations are easy to debrief in a large group by one faculty member.

Subjective examinations are associated with active learning and are characterized by essays, practical exercises or decision making exercises. Both the essay and practical exercise examinations require a faculty member to read it, review it, evaluate it and debrief it. All of this takes more time--faculty time. From personal experience an experienced faculty member requires 1-2 hours to read, review and evaluate an essay examination of moderate length. When you consider that the faculty member may be responsible for 13-16 students, the amount of time

becomes significant. Further, subjective examination require individual debriefs; thus, the faculty member must now budget time for student debriefs. Again, more faculty time is required.

Historically, the shift from passive to active learning has resulted in the educational institution restructuring the faculty and/or increasing faculty numbers to offset the faculty workload.

The Marine Corps Command and Staff College both restructured and increased faculty numbers.[58] Although this response was due to the implementation of the recommendations of the House Panel on Military Education, the result has been to lower the student/ faculty ratio and thus provide more time for faculty preparation, development and research.

Unfortunately, the rest of the Marine Corps University schools have not been able to lower student/faculty ratios and in some cases have experienced an increase. For example, Amphibious Warfare School, adequately staffed for a passive learning environment, shifted significant blocks of the curriculum to small group instruction and instituted more subjective examinations during the 1989-1992 timeframe. There was no increase in faculty staffing. Thus, the faculty experienced an exponential increase in workload and classroom contact hours. Faculty long term development, preparation and research suffered while the faculty rode the small group instruction treadmill.

Given that "active" learning takes place in small groups or seminars and that a low faculty/student ratio is required, logic dictates that the schools should be structured and staffed

accordingly.[59] The House Panel on Military Education recommended that the student/faculty ratio be between 3 and 4 to 1 for the senior and intermediate level schools.[60] Arguably, all schools in the Marine Corps University don't require a student/faculty ratio this low, but what level do they need? Is the 1 to 14 ratio at Amphibious Warfare School a satisfactory level to make the small group instruction work?

The issue needs to be addressed from the bottom up and will not benefit from changes on the margin of an instructor here or an instructor there. The old tables of organization and staffing documents should be thrown out and analysis begin with the question "How should my faculty be structured and how many do I need to make the active learning process work? Implicit in factoring this faculty/ student ratio are the demands on faculty time that often go undocumented or unaddressed like non resident instruction course preparation, reserve officer courses and faculty development.[61] Logically then, the Marine Corps can increase the faculty numbers, or decrease the class size. Therefore, if there is a mandated limit to what the Marine Corps can provide in faculty, then the class size should be shaped to the number of students that can be professionally educated with the resources available.[62] Continuing to function with structure and manning that have evolved from an era of passive learning and requiring it to support education in the transition to active learning will limit organizational effectiveness.

A book published in the early 1960s by a theoretical physicist

describes the dilemma of the Marine Corps University and its schools. The author describes two types of science; i.e., normal and revolutionary.[63] Normal science is based on shared paradigms or models and yields order to day-to-day practices. New discoveries or information are included in the body of knowledge, but the basic assumptions or the paradigm remains unchanged. In revolutionary science the basic foundations; i.e., the paradigm is changed to accommodate new information. Currently, the Marine Corps University is operating in the environment of normal science. Active learning has been adopted as a teaching philosophy and methodologies have been changed to support this trend. Yet, the basic paradigm remains unchanged as the structure and manning of the schools has not changed. Thus, to reach the potential offered by the active learning environment a paradigm shift is required.

The MCU has espoused institutional support for active learning as evidenced by official statements, increased small group instruction and subjective examinations. But, the failure to complete the change or break the paradigm by implementing robust faculty development programs and manning the schools to achieve faculty-student ratios more conducive to effective military education will result in a contradiction between the espoused values of the institution and the day-to-day real values. Edgar H. Schein, a noted management author and keen observer of organizational change, calls this contradiction the difference between what "ought" to be as opposed to what is.[64] Contradictions happen for many reasons, but usually surface because the espoused

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values are not completely embodied in the organization's culture. Management instructors would offer that contradictions of this type cause organizations to become dysfunctional at worst and less effective at best.[65] This is because often the two value systems conflict and conflict causes unnecessary friction. To paraphrase the patois of the rappers "We are talking the talk of active learning, but as an institution we aren't walking the walk." The students and faculty alike will soon notice the gap between espoused organizational goals of active learning and the day-to-day reality of passive learning.

Why change? The MCU is rapidly gaining a good reputation in the Department of Defense and graduates and former faculty members are serving with distinction throughout the world. Many would argue "if it ain't broke, don't fix it!" Well, the MCU ain't broke, but it isn't running at either peak efficiency or effectiveness. Therefore, why not try to make it better? Reinhold Niebuhr asked in his prayer of serenity that:

> God, give us grace to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed, courage to change the things which should be changed, and the wisdom to distinguish the one from the other.[66]

Do we have the institutional courage and wisdom to break the paradigm?

RECOMMENDATIONS

This review has focused on faculty, faculty environment and factors affecting faculty performance. Given the key role that faculty members play in the education process and the systemic problems described, the Marine Corps University cannot afford to be

complacent. The following changes should be made:

Developing a comprehensive plan to manage faculty identification, recruitment, selection, assignment, preparation, development and reutilization is key. Scarce assets call for centralized management. This plan must articulate how the University intends to manage faculty as a long term investment toward educational excellence. This plan must take advantage of the fact that all students in the University can be screened and evaluated for faculty potential. A centralized recruiting, selection and assignment process based on faculty potential and education vice availability can track candidates and negotiate assignments with the officer assignment branch. Additionally, the plan should identify, program and allocate the resources for faculty preparation and development. Finally, the plan should monitor faculty performance with input from the schools and identify successful faculty members as candidates for additional tours within the University.

Faculty development should be emphasized for all new and resident faculty. This emphasis should include both learning theory and teaching methodology. The focus should not be on administration. Additionally, it should be a long term process and systematic in design and not a hodge podge of unrelated topics. Increasing the faculty development emphasis does not mean making all faculty members professional educators. However, it does mean providing a model of the active learning environment with an emphasis on how to apply it in the classroom or seminar. Given

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that most faculty members have been educated in a strictly passive environment, this will be time well spent.

Institutionally, we expect Marine officers to report for faculty duty straight from a deployment and the next day function as an educator. Not only is this a false expectation, it is also unfair. The Marine Corps has a responsibility to prepare them. A sure way to achieve this preparation is to give them the time. New faculty members should serve a six month period as an apprentice faculty member. During this apprenticeship new faculty members would attend classes, observe resident faculty members in the small groups, attend faculty training sessions, read, conduct research and begin preparing themselves for future classes.

This can only be accomplished by staffing the schools at a higher level of manning in order to allow for the necessity of the apprenticeship. Although increasing the number of faculty members in an era of manpower reductions will hurt officer availability in the short term, it will allow the faculty to increase capability which is essential to the intellectual growth required to develop and teach the art of war.

School directors and school commanding officers provide the leadership and vision that keep our schools current. A two year tour is not long enough, however, for a colonel to conduct a proper estimate of the situation and subsequently implement, monitor and evaluate changes. A three year tour would provide the schools stability without risk of stagnation and allow the incumbent director to truly accomplish his vision.

Implementing a process of sourcing new faculty members from the graduates of the next higher level school provides the new faculty member with a solid foundation in the theory behind the doctrine. This foundation is important not only for faculty preparation, but it allows the faculty member to enter any dialogue at a higher educational level than the average student he is teaching. Additionally, it serves to support the maneuver warfare philosophy of knowing the commander's intent two levels up. By virtue of education at a higher level the faculty member can better articulate the linkage for the student.

This action would also make use of the school selection process as a qualitative instrument and reduce the potential for faculty members failing selection for the next higher grade.

The Marine Corps University should establish an "ad hoc" committee to perform an evaluation of the faculty assets desired to conduct professional military education in an active learning environment. The current organizations and manning levels that have evolved over time should be disregarded and the study should begin with requirements for active learning, i.e., student/faculty ratios.

The student/faculty ratio, however, should reflect faculty requirements for preparation, development, non-resident instruction course development, reserve officer course preparation and instruction and the aforementioned faculty apprenticeship program.

Finally, a faculty orientation course and a doctrinal orientation course for new faculty members should be established.

The purpose of the faculty orientation course would be to prepare new faculty members through a comprehensive study of learning theory, teaching methodologies, methods of critiquing essays, student briefings, and examinations and some practice or role playing teaching experience in the active learning environment. Faculty members would attend this course during their faculty apprenticeship period.

The faculty doctrinal orientation course would prepare faculty members through a comprehensive, but fast-paced review of FMFM-1, Warfighting, FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, FMFM 1-3, Tactics, and FMFM 2-1, Campaigning. Each faculty member would be required to demonstrate an understanding of the doctrine and its application. This course would also allow the University to instill common understanding, uniform agreement on terms and the shared way of thinking required by the maneuver warfare philosophy. Finally, this course should illustrate how our doctrine has evolved to allow our faculty to apply it to heretofore unimagined student solutions and ideas. Investment in faculty is an investment for the long term. This long term investment yields the Marine Corps more capability in the future. Capability to understand and fight not just the next war, but wars yet unimagined with technology yet uninvented. Again, faculty members would attend this course during the faculty apprenticeship phase of their development.

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